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Case Studies: Investor-State Attacks on Public Interest Policies

The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system, included in various “free trade” agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs), fundamentally shifts the balance of power among investors, States and the general public, creating an enforceable global governance regime that formally prioritizes corporate rights over the right of governments to regulate. ISDS provisions elevate individual foreign corporations and investors to the same status as sovereign governments, empowering them to privately enforce a public treaty by skirting domestic courts and directly “suing” signatory governments over public interest policies before extrajudicial tribunals.

The tribunals deciding these cases are composed of three private attorneys, unaccountable to any electorate. Some attorneys rotate between serving as “judges” and bringing cases for corporations against governments – such dual roles would be deemed unethical in most legal systems. Tribunals are not bound by precedent or the opinions of States, and their rulings cannot be appealed on the merits.

ISDS-enforced pacts provide foreign corporations broad substantive “rights” that even surpass the strong property rights afforded to domestic firms in nations such as the United States. This includes the “right” to a regulatory framework that conforms to foreign investors’ “expectations,” which ISDS tribunals have interpreted to mean that governments should not change regulatory policies once a foreign investment has been established.¹

Claiming such expansive rights, foreign corporations have used ISDS to attack an increasingly wide array of tobacco, climate, financial, mining, medicine, energy, pollution, water, labor, toxins, development and other non-trade domestic policies. The number of such cases has been soaring. While treaties with ISDS provisions have existed since the 1960s, just 50 known ISDS cases were launched in the regime’s first three decades combined.² In contrast, corporations have launched more than 50 ISDS claims in *each* of the last three years.³

If a tribunal rules against a challenged policy, there is no limit to the amount of taxpayer money that the tribunal can order the government to pay the foreign corporation. Such compensation orders are based on the “expected future profits” an ISDS tribunal surmises that an investor would have earned in the absence of the public policy it is attacking. Even when governments win cases, they are often ordered to pay for a share of the tribunal’s costs. Given that the costs just for defending a challenged policy in an ISDS case total \$8 million on average, the mere filing of a case can create a chilling effect on government policymaking, even if the government expects to win.⁴

Under U.S. FTAs alone, foreign firms have already pocketed more than \$430 million in taxpayer money via investor-state cases. This includes attacks on natural resource policies, environmental protections, health and safety measures and more. Tribunals have ordered more than \$3.6 billion in compensation to investors under all U.S. BITs and FTAs. More than \$38 billion remains in pending ISDS claims under these pacts, all of which relate to environmental, energy, financial regulation, public health, land use and transportation policies.⁵ What follows is a sample of the many investor-state attacks on public interest policies to date.

Health: Medicines, Tobacco and Toxins

Eli Lilly v. Canada (medicine patents), *pending*

Eli Lilly and Company, the fifth-largest U.S. pharmaceutical firm,⁶ launched a \$481 million claim against Canada in September 2013 under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).⁷ Eli Lilly is challenging Canada's patent standards after Canadian courts invalidated the firm's patents for Strattera and Zyprexa, drugs used to treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Canadian federal courts ruled that Eli Lilly had failed to meet the utility standard required to obtain a patent under Canadian law. Namely, the firm had failed to demonstrate or soundly predict that the drugs would provide the benefits that the company promised when applying for the patents' monopoly protection rights.⁸ The resulting invalidations of the patents paved the way for Canadian drug producers to produce less expensive, generic versions of the drugs.

Eli Lilly is asking a NAFTA tribunal to second-guess not only the courts' decisions, but Canada's entire legal basis for determining patents' validity. Eli Lilly argues that Canada's standard – that a patent holder is required to provide substantiation for its promises of a drug's utility in order to obtain or maintain a patent – is “arbitrary, unfair, unjust, and discriminatory.”⁹ The company claims Canada's legal standard violates the NAFTA guarantee of a “minimum standard of treatment” for foreign investors and resulted in a NAFTA-prohibited expropriation.¹⁰ A tribunal has been formed and the first procedural order was issued in May 2014.¹¹

Philip Morris v. Australia (tobacco regulation), *pending*; and Philip Morris v. Uruguay (tobacco regulation), *pending*

In November 2011, a Hong Kong subsidiary of the U.S.-based tobacco corporation Philip Morris International launched an investor-state case against a landmark anti-smoking law in Australia.¹² Philip Morris is challenging Australia's plain packaging law that requires tobacco products to be sold in packaging that is dominated by health warnings with the brand name of the product in standard font size at the bottom of the package.¹³ Phillip-Morris has not yet specified the amount of compensation it is demanding from the government, but has stated that the law could spell losses “potentially amounting to billions of dollars.”¹⁴ Philip Morris argues that the public health law “expropriated[] its valuable intellectual property” (by prohibiting the display of its logo, brand colors and the like) and violated its right to “fair and equitable treatment” as guaranteed under the Australia-Hong Kong BIT.¹⁵ Philip Morris' Hong Kong subsidiary had acquired shares in an Australian holding company at the same time the plain packaging policy was announced. The Australian government argues that the corporation's “investment” was merely a tool for launching the BIT claim against Australia.¹⁶

Philip Morris also attacked the law in Australia's domestic courts and pursued its challenge through the nation's highest court. In 2012, Australia's High Court ruled that the plain packaging law did not result in an unconstitutional acquisition of property and was justified as a public health measure.¹⁷ Regardless, Philip Morris continues to pursue its demand for compensation under the BIT. The plain packaging initiative was one of a number of strengthened tobacco policies the government introduced to meet its public health objectives.¹⁸ It has been lauded by the World Health Organization as a leading public health example for other countries to follow.¹⁹

At Philip Morris's request, the ongoing proceedings will be largely non-transparent, with public hearings prohibited and the public release of most documents left up to the discretion of each party. While Australia had argued for open hearings and transparent filings, Philip Morris refused, arguing

that even releasing documents after the conclusion of the arbitration “would be a time-consuming process with minimal gains for the public interest.”²⁰

Meanwhile, a Swiss subsidiary of Philip Morris International launched a similar case against Uruguay in February 2010 under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT. Uruguay also implemented a slate of anti-smoking measures that featured a requirement that packaging for tobacco products include large, graphic public health warnings. Philip Morris is seeking compensation for lost profits, arguing that the labeling policies violate the BIT as expropriations of its trademarks and as “unreasonable” measures with no rational relationship to public health objectives. In July 2013, the investor-state tribunal in this case ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case and it is now weighing the merits of the tobacco corporation’s arguments.²¹

Regardless of the final outcomes in these cases, already the investor-state system has had a chilling effect on tobacco control policies. In February 2013, New Zealand’s Ministry of Health announced that the government planned to introduce its own plain packaging legislation, but that it would wait until the investor-state case against Australia is resolved, and that enactment of New Zealand’s legislation could be delayed as a result.²² And, in 1994 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company threatened to bring a claim under NAFTA’s investment chapter as part of its successful lobbying campaign against Canada’s proposed “plain packaging” legislation, which would have required that all cigarettes be sold in standardized packaging without logos or trademarks. The firm sent a memorandum to the House of Commons arguing that plain packaging would constitute an illegal expropriation of a legally protected trademark, requiring Canada to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation.²³

Ethyl v. Canada (ban of toxic fuel additive), settled (investor paid \$13 million, ban reversed)

Ethyl Corporation, a U.S. chemical company, launched a NAFTA investor-state case in 1997 over a Canadian ban of MMT, a toxic gasoline additive used to improve engine performance.²⁴ MMT contains manganese – a known human neurotoxin.²⁵ Canadian legislators, concerned about MMT’s public health and environmental risks, including its interference with emission-control systems, banned MMT’s intra-provincial transport and importation in 1997.²⁶ Given that Canadian provinces have jurisdiction over most environmental matters, such actions are how a national ban of a substance could be enacted in Canada. When the law was being considered, Ethyl explicitly threatened that it would respond with a NAFTA challenge.²⁷ MMT is not used in most countries outside Canada. It is banned by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in reformulated gasoline.²⁸ Making good on its threat, Ethyl initiated a NAFTA claim against the toxics ban, arguing that it constituted a NAFTA-forbidden “indirect” expropriation of its assets.²⁹

Though Canada argued that Ethyl did not have standing under NAFTA to bring the challenge, a NAFTA tribunal rejected Canada’s objections in a June 1998 jurisdictional decision that paved the way for a ruling on the substance of the case.³⁰ Less than a month after losing the jurisdictional ruling, the Canadian government announced that it would settle with Ethyl. The terms of that settlement required the government to pay the firm \$13 million in damages and legal fees, post advertising saying MMT was safe, and reverse the ban on MMT.³¹ As a result, today Canada depends largely on voluntary restrictions to reduce the presence of MMT in gas.³²

Environment: Climate Change

Vattenfall v. Germany I (coal-fired electric plant/climate change), *settled (environmental conditions rolled back)*

Vattenfall, a Swedish energy firm, launched a \$1.9 billion investor-state claim against Germany in 2009 under the Energy Charter Treaty over permits delays for a coal-fired power plant in Hamburg.³³ According to Vattenfall, delays of required government permits started when the state's environmental ministry established "very clear requirements" for the plant, due to "the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change having alerted the public to the impending climate change."³⁴ Public opposition to the proposed plant focused on prospective carbon emissions and water pollution. Further delays, according to Vattenfall, occurred when the Green Party – which opposed the plant on environmental grounds – formed a coalition with the Christian Democrats after state elections in 2008. After Vattenfall litigated in domestic courts, the coalition government issued the permits to Vattenfall, but with additional requirements to protect the Elbe River.³⁵

Rather than comply with these requirements, Vattenfall launched its investor-state claim against Germany, arguing that Hamburg's environmental rules amounted to an expropriation and a violation of Germany's obligation to afford foreign investors "fair and equitable treatment."³⁶ In response, Michael Müller, then Germany's deputy environment minister, stated, "It's really unprecedented how we are being pilloried just for implementing German and European Union (EU) laws."³⁷ To avoid the uncertainty of a prospective investor-state tribunal ruling ordering payment of a massive amount of compensation, the German government reached a settlement with Vattenfall in 2010. The settlement obliged the Hamburg government to drop its additional environmental requirements and issue the contested permits required for the plant to proceed. The settlement also waived Vattenfall's earlier commitments to mitigate the coal plant's impact on the Elbe River.³⁸ Any monetary payment extracted from German taxpayers in the settlement has not been disclosed. Vattenfall's coal plant in Hamburg began operating in February 2014.³⁹

Energy and Public Safety

Vattenfall v. Germany II (nuclear energy), *pending*

In May 2012, Vattenfall launched a second investor-state claim under the Energy Charter Treaty against Germany, demanding at least \$1 billion in taxpayer compensation for Germany's decision to phase out nuclear power.⁴⁰ The government made that decision in response to widespread German public opposition to nuclear power generation in the wake of Japan's 2011 Fukushima nuclear power disaster. The German Parliament amended the Atomic Energy Act to roll back a 2010 extension of the lifespan of nuclear plants, and to abandon the use of nuclear energy by 2022.⁴¹

Vattenfall claims Germany's policy change violates its obligations to foreign investors under the Energy Charter Treaty. While Vattenfall's written claim has not been disclosed, press reports have indicated that the corporation is demanding between \$1 billion and \$4.7 billion from German taxpayers for claimed losses relating to two Vattenfall nuclear plants affected by the phase-out.⁴² Though Germany attempted to halt Vattenfall's claim as one "manifestly without merit," the investor-state tribunal decided in 2013 to allow the claim to proceed.⁴³ It is pending.

Lone Pine v. Canada (fracking), *pending*

In September 2013, Lone Pine Resources, a U.S.-based oil and gas exploration and production company, launched a \$241 million challenge against Canada under NAFTA to challenge Quebec's suspension of oil and gas exploration permits for deposits under the St. Lawrence River as part of a wider moratorium on the controversial practice of hydraulic fracturing, or fracking.⁴⁴ The provincial government had declared a moratorium in 2011 so as to conduct an environmental impact assessment of the extraction method widely known for leaching chemicals and gases into groundwater and the air.⁴⁵

Lone Pine had plans and permits to engage in fracking on over 30,000 acres of land directly beneath the St. Lawrence Seaway – the province's largest waterway.⁴⁶ According to Lone Pine, the moratorium contravened NAFTA's protection against expropriation and guarantee of a "minimum standard of treatment."⁴⁷ The case is pending.

Occidental Petroleum v. Ecuador (oil concession), *investor win (awarded \$2.3 billion)*

In 2006, Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy) launched a claim against Ecuador under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT after the government terminated an oil concession due to the U.S. oil corporation's breach of the contract and Ecuadorian law.⁴⁸ Oxy illegally sold 40 percent of its production rights to another firm without government approval, despite a provision in the concession contract stating that sale of Oxy's production rights without government pre-approval would terminate the contract.⁴⁹ The contract explicitly enforced Ecuador's hydrocarbons law, which protects the government's prerogative to vet companies seeking to produce oil in its territory – a particular concern in the environmentally sensitive Amazon region where Oxy was operating.⁵⁰ Oxy launched its BIT claim two days after the Ecuadorian government terminated the oil concession, claiming that the government's enforcement of the contract terms and hydrocarbons law violated its BIT commitments, including the obligation to provide the firm "fair and equitable treatment."⁵¹

The tribunal acknowledged that Oxy had broken the law,⁵² that the response of the Ecuadorian government (forfeiture of the firm's investment) was lawful, and that Oxy should have expected that response.⁵³ But the tribunal then concocted a new obligation for the government (one not specified by the BIT itself) to respond proportionally to Oxy's legal breach as part of the "fair and equitable treatment" requirement. Deeming themselves the arbiters of proportionality, the tribunal determined that Ecuador had violated the novel investor-state obligation.⁵⁴

The tribunal majority ordered Ecuador to pay Oxy \$2.3 billion (including compound interest) – one of the largest investor-state awards to date.⁵⁵ To calculate this penalty, the tribunal estimated the amount of future profits that Oxy would have received from full exploitation of the oil reserves it had forfeited due to its legal breach, including profits from not-yet-discovered reserves.⁵⁶ Using logic that a dissenting tribunalist described as "egregious," the tribunal determined that the damages should be based on the entire value of Oxy's original contract even though the firm had sold a 40 percent share – because the sale violated Ecuadorian law and therefore could not be recognized.⁵⁷ And the tribunal arbitrarily concluded that Ecuador was 75 percent responsible for the conflict and thus should pay 75 percent of the projected losses to Oxy,⁵⁸ even though the conflict arose from Oxy selling unauthorized rights under a contract that explicitly stipulated that doing so could cause forfeiture of the investment. Ecuador has filed a request for annulment of the award, and a decision on annulment is pending.⁵⁹

Environment: Toxic Pollution

Chevron v. Ecuador (Amazonian oil pollution), *pending*

In 2009, Chevron Corporation – one of the largest U.S. oil corporations – launched a case against Ecuador under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT seeking to evade payment of a multi-billion dollar court ruling against the company for widespread pollution of the Amazon rainforest.⁶⁰ For 26 years, Texaco, later acquired by Chevron, performed oil operations in Ecuador. Ecuadorian courts have found that during that period the company dumped billions of gallons of toxic water and dug hundreds of open-air oil sludge pits in Ecuador's Amazon,⁶¹ poisoning the communities of some 30,000 Amazon residents, including the entire populations of six indigenous groups (one of which is now extinct).⁶² After a legal battle spanning two decades and two countries, in November 2013 Ecuador's highest court upheld prior rulings against Chevron for contaminating a large section of Ecuador's Amazon and ordered the corporation to pay \$9.5 billion to provide desperately needed clean-up and health care to afflicted indigenous communities.⁶³

Instead of abiding by the rulings, Chevron asked an investor-state tribunal to challenge the decision produced by Ecuador's domestic legal system. Chevron has asked the tribunal to order Ecuador's taxpayers to hand over to the corporation any of the billions in damages it might be required to pay to clean up the still-devastated Amazon, plus all the legal fees incurred by the corporation in its investor-state pursuit.⁶⁴ In its investor-state claim, Chevron is seeking to re-litigate key aspects of the lengthy domestic court case, including whether the effected communities even had a right to sue the corporation. Chevron is claiming that its special foreign investor rights under the BIT have been violated.⁶⁵ This, despite the fact that Texaco's investment in Ecuador ended in 1992,⁶⁶ the BIT did not take effect until 1997,⁶⁷ and the BIT is not supposed to apply retroactively to cover past investments.⁶⁸

The investor-state tribunal in this case has granted several of Chevron's requests. It has ordered Ecuador's government to violate its own Constitution and block enforcement of a ruling upheld on appeal in its independent court system.⁶⁹ And in a decision in September 2013, the tribunal took it upon itself to offer an interpretation of the Ecuadorian Constitution, which conflicted with that of Ecuador's own high court, and declare that rights granted by Ecuadorian law do not actually exist.⁷⁰ The tribunal has not yet concluded its findings, and a final decision is pending.

Renco v. Peru (metal smelter pollution), *pending*

The Renco Group, a corporation owned by Ira Rennert,⁷¹ notified Peru in 2010 that it intended to launch an \$800 million investor-state claim against the government. Renco argues that Peru had violated the U.S.-Peru FTA by not granting the company a *third* extension on its overdue commitment to install pollution abatement equipment in a metal smelter⁷² it owned in La Oroya, Peru – one of the world's most polluted sites.⁷³ Doe Run Peru, Renco's Peruvian subsidiary, had agreed to various environmental requirements when it acquired the facility in 1997.⁷⁴ The Peruvian government granted two extensions of the 2007 date by which Doe Run was to have built a sulfur oxide treatment facility – a commitment that the corporation repeatedly failed to fulfill.⁷⁵ In 2007 and 2008, Doe Run was challenged in class action lawsuits in Missouri courts, claiming damages to children for toxic emissions, including extremely high lead emissions, from the smelter since its acquisition by Renco.⁷⁶

In its brief launching the investor-state case against Peru, the firm claimed a violation of fair and equitable treatment and blamed Peru for not granting a third extension on its unfulfilled 1997 environmental commitments. The firm also claimed that Peru, not Renco, should have assumed

liability for the Missouri cases.⁷⁷ In more recent filings, Renco has clarified that it is asking the tribunal to hold Peru responsible for all losses and costs from the Missouri suits, and to order compensation for “moral damages arising from harm to Claimant’s reputation.”⁷⁸ While Doe Run, Renco’s Peruvian subsidiary, has gone bankrupt and was taken over by creditors that plan to sell the firm this year,⁷⁹ Renco has continued to advance its investor-state claim.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, the mere filing of the investor-state case achieved Renco’s goals with respect to the Missouri state court cases seeking compensation for La Oroya’s children. Renco had tried unsuccessfully three times to remove the case to federal court.⁸¹ A Missouri jury pool was likely to be skeptical of Renco after its highly publicized pollution in Missouri.⁸² But a week after launching its investor-state claim, Renco tried a fourth time to remove the case and succeeded. The same judge that had denied the previous requests cited the filing of the investor-state claim as the basis.⁸³

Metalclad v. Mexico (toxic waste), investor win (awarded \$16.2 million)

In 1997 Metalclad Corporation, a U.S. waste management firm, launched a NAFTA investor-state dispute against Mexico over the decision of Guadalupe, ⁸⁴ a Mexican municipality, not to grant a construction permit for expansion of a toxic waste facility amid concerns of water contamination and other environmental and health hazards.⁸⁵ Studies indicated that the site’s soils were very unstable, which could permit toxic waste to infiltrate the subsoil and carry contamination via deeper water sources.⁸⁶ The local government had already denied similar permits to the Mexican firm from which Metalclad acquired the facility.⁸⁷ Metalclad argued that the decision to deny a permit to it, as a foreign investor operating under NAFTA’s investor rights, amounted to expropriation without compensation, and a denial of NAFTA’s guarantee of “fair and equitable treatment.”⁸⁸

The tribunal ruled in favor of the firm, ordering Mexico to compensate Metalclad for the diminution of its investment’s value.⁸⁹ The order to compensate for a “regulatory taking” was premised on the tribunal’s finding that the denial of the construction permit unless and until the site was remediated amounted to an “indirect” expropriation.⁹⁰ The tribunal also ruled that Mexico violated NAFTA’s obligation to provide foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment,”⁹¹ because the firm was not granted a “transparent and predictable” regulatory environment.⁹² The decision has been described as creating a duty under NAFTA for the Mexican government to walk a foreign investor through the complexities of municipal, state and federal law and to ensure that officials at different levels never give different advice.⁹³ After a Canadian court slightly modified the compensation amount ordered by the investor-state tribunal,⁹⁴ Mexico was required to pay Metalclad more than \$16 million.

S.D. Myers v. Canada (toxic waste), investor win (awarded \$5.6 million)

In 1998 S.D. Myers, a U.S. waste treatment company, launched a NAFTA investor-state challenge against a temporary Canadian ban on the export of a hazardous waste called polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB).⁹⁵ Canada banned exports of toxic waste to the United States absent explicit permission from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. And, as a signatory to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Canadian policy generally limited exports of toxic waste.⁹⁶ Meanwhile, the U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act banned imports of hazardous waste, with limited exceptions such as waste from U.S. military bases.⁹⁷ The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has determined that PCBs are harmful to humans and toxic to the environment.⁹⁸ However, in 1995 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency decided to allow S.D. Myers and nine other companies to import PCBs into the United States for processing and disposal.⁹⁹ Canada issued a temporary ban on PCB shipment, seeking to review the conflicting laws and

regulations and its obligations under the Basel Convention.¹⁰⁰ S.D. Myers argued that the Canadian ban constituted “disguised discrimination,” was “tantamount to an expropriation” and violated NAFTA’s prohibition of performance requirements and obligation to afford a “minimum standard of treatment.”¹⁰¹

A tribunal upheld S.D. Myers’ claims of discrimination and found the export ban to violate NAFTA’s “minimum standard of treatment” obligation because it limited the firm’s plan to treat the waste in Ohio.¹⁰² The panel also stated that a foreign firm’s “market share” in another country could be considered a NAFTA-protected investment and eschewed Canada’s argument that S.D. Meyers had no real investment in Canada.¹⁰³ The tribunal ordered Canada to pay the company \$5.6 million.

Abengoa v. Mexico (toxic waste), investor win (awarded \$40 million plus interest)

In December 2009, Abengoa, a Spanish technology firm, filed a claim against Mexico under the Spain-Mexico BIT for preventing the company from operating a waste management facility that the local community of Zimapan strongly opposed on environmental grounds.¹⁰⁴ The plant was to be built on a geological fault line across from a dam and the Sierra Gorda biosphere reserve – an UNESCO World Heritage site and home to Nahuatl and Otomi indigenous communities. The region was already contaminated with arsenic from previous mining operations. The community contended that building a waste facility on a fault line, by a dam, in an area contaminated with arsenic, near indigenous communities and an environmental reserve posed a significant environmental threat.¹⁰⁵

As a result of substantial public opposition, Abengoa’s land use permit was not renewed in December 2007, although construction continued anyway. In April 2009, clashes broke out between a group of people from Zimapan and the Mexican federal police over the plant. As a result, the company’s operating license was revoked several days later. Despite this, the situation escalated as Mexican federal police were accused of abuses against the indigenous population and federal government officials declared the plant could open without municipal authority. In March 2010, the municipality of Zimapan declared that the operating license was invalid because it was not collectively issued by the city council and did not comply with the public interest.¹⁰⁶

Abengoa alleged that the government actions impeding the operation of its waste plant violated its BIT-protected investor rights.¹⁰⁷ In April 2013 a tribunal ruled in favor of Abengoa, deciding that the denial of an operating license for the controversial hazardous waste facility amounted to an indirect expropriation of Abengoa’s investment and that the local government’s actions violated the corporation’s guarantee of a “minimum standard of treatment.”¹⁰⁸ The tribunal ordered Mexico to pay Abengoa more than \$40 million, plus interest, as compensation for its expected future profits from the waste plant and to cover half of the corporation’s own tribunal and legal costs.¹⁰⁹

Environment: Mining

Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica (mining), pending

In February 2014 Infinito Gold, a Canadian mining firm, filed a \$94 million claim against Costa Rica under the Costa Rica-Canada BIT for a Costa Rican court decision to revoke Infinito’s Las Crucitas open-pit gold mining concession on environmental grounds.¹¹⁰ The mining license was secured in 2008 from then-President Oscar Arias and his environment minister. The Costa Rican Administrative Appeals Court later ordered a criminal investigation of Arias for having signed off on the project while

environmental studies were still incomplete.¹¹¹ The concession raised significant environmental concerns, including deforestation of 153 acres of pristine tropical rainforest. It also posed a significant health concern related to the leaching of chemicals used in the mining process that could contaminate drinking water near the San Juan river system.¹¹²

A Costa Rican court revoked the concession in 2010 on the basis of environmental damage caused by the project.¹¹³ Polls indicated that more than 75 percent of the Costa Rican population opposed the proposed mine, due in part to environmental concerns.¹¹⁴ Several weeks before the court ruling revoking Infinito's concession, the Costa Rican legislature voted unanimously to ban new open-pit metal mines.¹¹⁵ Infinito appealed to Costa Rica's Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court ruling against the firm in 2011.¹¹⁶ In its investor-state claim, Infinito asks a three-person tribunal to second-guess the rulings of Costa Rica's courts and rule that Costa Rica's prohibitions on new open-pit mining permits are an "unlawful expropriation" of Infinito's investment and a violation of the firm's BIT-protected right to "fair and equitable treatment." "As a result of the new ban on open-pit mining, Industrias Infinito cannot apply for any new mining rights over the project area," the firm noted in its brief.¹¹⁷ The case is pending.

Financial Stability

Postova banka v. Greece (sovereign debt), *pending*

In May 2013 Postova banka, a Slovak business, and its Cypriot shareholder, Istrokaptal, launched an investor-state claim against Greece under the Slovakia-Greece BIT and the Cyprus-Greece BIT after Greece changed the terms of its sovereign bonds to comply with EU and International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions for a bailout, in an effort to exit its massive debt crisis and avoid default.¹¹⁸ Starting in 2008, Greece faced its worst economic crisis since World War II as a result of the global economic recession, structural problems and exorbitant deficits.¹¹⁹ In 2010 Standard & Poor's downgraded Greece's debt to 'junk bond' status because of concerns Greece was going to default or restructure.¹²⁰ That same year, Postova purchased Greek debt.¹²¹

Greece then undertook the biggest sovereign debt restructuring in history in an effort to avoid default. The terms of an EU and IMF bailout required Greece to reach a deal with investors to swap their Greek government bonds for new, less valuable securities.¹²² In 2012 legislation was enacted to alter the bond, enabling a forcible substitution of Postova's bonds for new securities that were worth less.¹²³ The "haircut" applied to domestic and foreign investors alike. In practice, it impacted Greek banks the most, as they held the largest shares of Greek bonds.¹²⁴ The domestic investors, however, lack the foreign investors' ability to launch an extrajudicial investor-state claim against the government. In their claim, Postova and Istrokaptal contend that Greece's IMF-mandated, nondiscriminatory debt restructuring violated their foreign investor rights. This is the first investor-state case against Greece for its policies to stem the financial crisis.¹²⁵

Saluka v. Czech Republic (too-big-to-fail), *investor win (awarded \$236 million)*

Saluka Investments, a Netherlands investment company, filed an investor-state claim in 2001 under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT against the Czech government for not bailing out a private bank, in which the company had a stake, in the same way that the government bailed out banks in which the government had a major stake.¹²⁶ The bailouts came in response to a widespread bank debt crisis.¹²⁷ Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB), the first large bank to be fully privatized in the Czech Republic,¹²⁸ along with three large banks in which the government retained significant ownership, had been

suffering from significant debt and borderline insolvency, threatening the Czech banking sector.¹²⁹ Consequently, the government placed IPB into forced administration in 2000 and then sold the bank for one crown to another bank.¹³⁰

Saluka, a minority shareholder in IPB,¹³¹ claimed the Czech government violated the BIT's "fair and equitable treatment" provisions because the government did not give IPB the same degree of assistance as it gave to the banks in which the government possessed a large stake.¹³² The government argued that rectifying IPB's debt problems was the responsibility of private shareholders, while the problems of the large banks in which the government had a major shareholding interest were the government's responsibility.¹³³

The investor-state tribunal decided that the Czech Republic had violated the BIT's "fair and equitable" treatment obligation and acted discriminatorily by giving greater government aid to banks in which the government was a major stakeholder.¹³⁴ The tribunal ordered the government to pay Saluka \$236 million.¹³⁵

CMS Gas v. Argentina (emergency stability measures), investor win (awarded \$133 million plus interest)

In July 2001, CMS Gas Transmission Company, a U.S. energy firm, filed a claim against Argentina under the U.S.-Argentina BIT for financial rebalancing policies enacted in response to a 2001 economic meltdown spurring social and political unrest.¹³⁶ The case particularly targeted the government's limitations on gas utility rate increases – an effort, as part of Argentina's Economic Emergency Law, to stem runaway inflation.¹³⁷

While utility rates were frozen, the international value of the Argentine peso, which had been pegged to the dollar, dropped precipitously. CMS claimed large revenue losses, argued that the freezing of consumers' rates violated the BIT's expropriation and "fair and equitable treatment" obligations, and demanded taxpayer compensation.¹³⁸ The Argentine government contended that the reforms were non-discriminatory and that domestic investors also had to face economic losses as a result of the emergency measures.¹³⁹

Argentina further argued that the measures were necessary, given that it faced a national emergency.¹⁴⁰ The U.S.-Argentina BIT states, "This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests."¹⁴¹ But the tribunal decided that that the economic crisis in Argentina was not sufficiently severe for Argentina to be able to use this defense. It ruled that the government had denied CMS "fair and equitable treatment" and that Argentina's taxpayers owed the company \$133 million, plus interest.¹⁴² A year and a half later, a tribunal in another investor-state case came to a different conclusion, accepting Argentina's "necessity defense" for the same economic crisis.¹⁴³ In that case, also brought under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, three U.S. energy companies known collectively as LG&E challenged Argentina's emergency measures, alleging the same BIT violations that CMS alleged. But in contrast to the tribunal in the CMS case, the LG&E tribunal concluded that Argentina's actions were permissible under the BIT's "necessity defense" because Argentina "faced an extremely serious threat to its existence, its political and economic survival, to the possibility of maintaining its essential services in operation, and to the preservation of its internal peace."¹⁴⁴

In response to the tribunal's contrasting decision in the *CMS* case, Argentina's Minister of Justice Horacio Rosatti noted that it was obvious to every Argentine citizen that consumer rates for public utility services should not be decided by a foreign tribunal.¹⁴⁵ CMS eventually sold the "financial claim" resulting from its investor-state award to a "vulture fund" subsidiary of Bank of America.¹⁴⁶ The bank subsidiary, Blue Ridge Investment, purchased from CMS the rights to collect on the investor-state tribunal's award and has since sought to enforce the award in U.S. courts.¹⁴⁷

Eureko v. Poland (insurance privatization), settled (investor obtained \$1.6 billion)

In 2003, Eureko, a Netherlands-based company, filed a claim against Poland under the Netherlands-Poland BIT for prohibiting it from taking a controlling stake in PZU, Poland's first and largest insurance company.¹⁴⁸ Facing significant public and political opposition to a previous administration's decision to sell a controlling share of Poland's public insurance firm to a foreign corporation, the Polish government reversed its privatization plans.¹⁴⁹

Eureko argued that the government's actions amounted to a violation of its BIT-mandated obligation to provide "fair and equitable treatment." While divided, the majority of the tribunal held in a 2005 decision that Poland indeed violated that obligation, in addition to the prohibition against uncompensated expropriation.¹⁵⁰ The tribunal also decided that the government's actions had violated a private contract with Eureko, and that this alleged contractual violation itself constituted a violation of the BIT. The tribunal determined that it was able to use the BIT to enforce the terms of a private contract through what is known as an 'umbrella clause' – a BIT provision that empowers foreign investors to elevate contractual disputes to BIT investor-state cases.¹⁵¹ The dissenting tribunal member noted that empowering a firm to transform a contractual dispute into a BIT case "created a potentially dangerous precedent."¹⁵²

Poland also took issue with the appointment by Eureko of the arbitrator Judge Stephen Schwebel, who had a working relationship with a law firm that was launching other investor-state cases against Poland. After Poland's attempt to challenge the appointment of Schwebel failed, the arbitration was expected to proceed to the damages phase, when a settlement was reached instead.¹⁵³ Under the settlement, Eureko obtained a reported \$1.6 billion for Poland's decision to maintain domestic control of the country's largest insurance firm.¹⁵⁴

Essential Services

Azurix v. Argentina (water), investor win (awarded \$165 million plus interest)

U.S. water company Azurix Corp. (an Enron subsidiary) filed a claim against Argentina under the U.S.-Argentina BIT in 2001 over a dispute related to its controversial water services contract in the province of Buenos Aires.¹⁵⁵ During a 1999 water privatization deal, the company won a 30-year concession to provide water and sewage treatment to 2.5 million people.¹⁵⁶ Within a few months, residents complained of foul odors coming from the water. Local governments advised against drinking or paying for tap water and street protests against the water service were held.¹⁵⁷ After the problem was identified as algae contamination of a reservoir, Azurix alleged the algae was the government's responsibility and demanded compensation for associated costs.¹⁵⁸ The government argued that Azurix had a contractual responsibility to ensure clean drinking water.¹⁵⁹ In the following year, residents experienced a series of water outages and were repeatedly over-billed by Azurix for water, resulting in government fines.¹⁶⁰ Azurix withdrew from its contract in 2001.¹⁶¹

Azurix then launched its claim under the BIT, claiming that the government had expropriated its investment and denied the firm “fair and equitable treatment” by not allowing rate increases and not investing sufficient public funds in the water infrastructure.¹⁶² In its deliberations, the tribunal weighed whether legitimate public interest policies could constitute BIT violations. The three tribunalists decided, “the issue is not so much whether the measure concerned is legitimate and serves a public purpose, but whether it is a measure that, *being legitimate and serving a public purpose, should give rise to a compensation claim.*”[emphasis added]¹⁶³ The Tribunal ruled that Argentina violated Azurix’s right to “fair and equitable treatment,” among other breaches, and ordered the government to pay the Enron subsidiary \$165 million plus interest, in addition to covering almost all of the tribunal’s costs.¹⁶⁴

RDC v. Guatemala (transportation), investor win (awarded \$18.6 million)

U.S.-based Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) launched an investor-state claim in 2007 under the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) after the government of Guatemala initiated a legal process to consider revoking a disputed railroad contract with the firm.¹⁶⁵ RDC was engaged in the domestic legal process but still alleged that it had been denied fair and equitable treatment.

Guatemala privatized its railroad system in 1997. RDC’s contract in that privatization provided for rehabilitation of the entire railway network in five phases and significant investment in rolling stock and rail lines. After its first eight years of operation, RDC had only completed the first phase.¹⁶⁶ The Guatemalan government initiated a review of an RDC contract in a process that could result in its termination, after multiple assessments concluded that it did not comply with Guatemalan law.¹⁶⁷ This process, called *lesivo*, provided RDC the opportunity to present its case before an administrative court, and then appeal the resulting decision to the country’s Supreme Court.¹⁶⁸ Most *lesivo* actions taken by the Guatemalan government pertained to domestic firms.

While taking advantage of this domestic due process and continuing to earn money from its investment, RDC launched its CAFTA claim. It alleged that the *lesivo* itself was an indirect expropriation and a violation of CAFTA’s national treatment and “minimum standard of treatment” rules.¹⁶⁹ The tribunal not only allowed the ISDS claim to move forward despite the unresolved domestic process, but opined that in such instances of parallel ISDS claims, investors should be allowed to access extrajudicial investor-state proceedings *before* the conclusion of domestic legal processes.¹⁷⁰

In 2012 the tribunal ruled in favor of RDC, ordering the government to pay the firm \$18.6 million. The tribunal upheld the allegation that Guatemala’s initiation of the *lesivo* process had failed to afford RDC a “minimum standard of treatment.”¹⁷¹ In doing so, the tribunal ignored the definition of that standard found in a CAFTA Annex that was ostensibly designed to limit tribunalist discretion. CAFTA governments had inserted the annex after a series of investor-state had interpreted the “minimum standard of treatment” obligation to mean that investors must be guaranteed a stable regulatory framework *that does not frustrate the expectations* they held at the time they established their investment.¹⁷² In defending itself against an investor-state challenge that tried to invoke this sweeping interpretation, the U.S. government stated, “if States were prohibited from regulating in any manner that frustrated expectations – or had to compensate for any diminution in profit – they would lose the power to regulate.”¹⁷³ By defining “minimum standard of treatment” in the CAFTA Annex as derived from customary international law that “results from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation,” the U.S. and other CAFTA governments attempted to

constrain “minimum standard of treatment” to an obligation to afford such basic rights as due process and police protection.¹⁷⁴ But the *RDC* tribunal ignored the annex and rejected the official submissions of four CAFTA governments, including the U.S. government, arguing that the foreign investor right was limited.¹⁷⁵ Instead, the tribunal borrowed a broad interpretation of “minimum standard of treatment,” one that included protection of investors’ expectations, from another investor-state tribunal and used it to rule against Guatemala.¹⁷⁶

TCW v. Dominican Republic (electricity), settled (investor paid \$26.5 million)

In 2007 TCW Group, a U.S. investment management corporation that jointly owned with the government one of the Dominican Republic’s three electricity distribution firms, claimed that the government violated CAFTA by failing to raise electricity rates and failing to prevent electricity theft by poor residents.¹⁷⁷ The French multinational Société Générale (SG), which owned the TCW Group, filed a parallel claim under the France-Dominican Republic BIT.¹⁷⁸

TCW launched its claim two weeks after CAFTA’s enactment, arguing that decisions taken before the treaty’s implementation violated the treaty.¹⁷⁹ TCW took issue with the government’s unwillingness to raise electricity rates, a decision undertaken in response to a nationwide energy crisis. TCW also protested that the government did not subsidize electricity rates, which would have diminished electricity theft by poor residents. The *New York Times* noted that such subsidization was not feasible for the government after having just spent large sums to rectify a banking crisis.¹⁸⁰ TCW alleged expropriation and violation of CAFTA’s guarantee of fair and equitable treatment.

TCW demanded \$606 million from the government for the alleged CAFTA violations, despite having spent just \$2 to purchase the business from another U.S. investor.¹⁸¹ The company also admitted to having “not independently committed additional capital” to the electricity distribution firm after its \$2 purchase in 2004.¹⁸² After a tribunal constituted under the France-Dominican Republic BIT issued a jurisdictional ruling in favor of SG, allowing the case to move forward, the government decided to settle with SG and TCW. The government paid the foreign firms \$26.5 million to drop the cases, reasoning that it was cheaper than continuing to pay legal fees.¹⁸³

Labor Rights

Veolia v. Egypt (minimum wage), pending

Veolia Propreté, a French multinational corporation, launched an investor-state claim against Egypt in 2012, demanding at least \$110 million under the France-Egypt BIT over disputes relating to a 15-year contract for waste management in the city of Alexandria.¹⁸⁴ The corporation claims that having to comply with changes to Egyptian laws of general application violated the government’s contractual commitments to keep payments to Veolia aligned with cost increases.¹⁸⁵

Among its claims, Veolia argues that changes to Egypt’s labor laws – including increases to minimum wages – have negatively affected the company’s investment, and that Egypt has violated its contract and the BIT’s investor protections by not helping the corporation offset such costs.¹⁸⁶ An investor-state tribunal was established in 2013 and the case is pending.¹⁸⁷

Development and Industrial Policy

ExxonMobil and Murphy Oil v. Canada (research and development), *investor win*

In 2007 Mobil Investments Canada, owned by U.S. oil giant ExxonMobil, and U.S.-based Murphy Oil Corporation used NAFTA to challenge the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board's Guidelines for Research and Development Expenditures.¹⁸⁸ The guidelines require oil extraction firms to pay fees to support research and development in one of Canada's poorest provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador. It applies to domestic and foreign concession holders alike.¹⁸⁹ Offshore oil fields in the region, developed after significant infusions of public and private funds, were discovered to be far larger than anticipated, prompting a variety of new government measures that applied to all concession holders.¹⁹⁰

In their NAFTA claim, the oil corporations argued that the new guidelines violated NAFTA's prohibition on performance requirements. In 2012 a tribunal majority ruled in favor of Mobil and Murphy Oil, deeming the requirement to use larger-than-expected oil revenue to fund research and development as a NAFTA-barred performance requirement. While the amount of the payment ordered by the tribunal has not been made public, it is expected to include the tribunal's estimation of the corporations' expected future profits.¹⁹¹

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